| Abstrakt: |
Ukraine has currently become the focal point and symbol of the power struggle between Russia and the West. Putin’s perception of Russia being humiliated has led to a foreign policy which denounces liberal values in practice and instead reasserts the sovereignty, integrity, and exceptionalism of the state. Manipulation with historical facts and reliance on religion and cultural ties are only a few of the ideas in Russia’s foreign identity discourse being used to justify the invasion of Ukraine. Combining these with the idea that the people of Ukraine should be saved from a repressive neo-Nazi regime in Kyiv both mobilizes and constructs the reassurance that Russia’s actions in Ukraine can be viewed as justifiable and, moreover, that Russia has a God-given mission and an exceptional role in the world. The significance of ideas in foreign policy actions is emphasized in the works of post-positivist authors, where poststructuralist and constructivist theoretical approaches have attempted to locate the significance and co-constitution of the aforementioned actions. It is presumed that foreign identity discourses consist of specific ideas, articulated by key policy players, like Putin, based on the specific governance model in Russia. In the case of Russia’s foreign identity, this is prominently being formulated through the process of differentiation. Therefore, Russia’s foreign policy and more specifically, its actions in Ukraine can be analyzed from an identity differentiation perspective, diving deeper into the ideas that support it in discourse. Russia’s unique historical experience has become one of the central ideas that outline its identity, along with its special self-presumed role as savior of the oppressed in the international system. The historical ideas revived by the Kremlin are part of a narrative regarding Russia’s shared experiences with their Slavic brothers which should be re-enacted yet again. And because this is a construction of ideas, it is not important that they do not exist in the material world – the more this is emphasized and repeated, the more significance it gains and facilitates justification of certain policies. The presumption of a Western hegemony has been co-created by Russia’s perception that its sovereignty is being threatened and there is an urgency to preserve its value system intact – without the influence of Western ideas. However, the unwillingness of the West, and especially the United States to bend before the Kremlin exerts its interest in its neighboring countries, and much further beyond, has promoted Russia to construct a foreign identity in direct opposition to the West. This is evidenced by the fact that although Putin was once considered a pragmatic leader, from 2014 onwards the scope of the threat directed by the West has grown exponentially in his narrative, a signal of the Kremlin losing interest in reaching a consensus on this. Moreover, this goes hand in hand with Russia’s bid for its place in the international system as an opposing power center to the US-led Western model. However, Russia’s foreign identity discourse does not only explain current events, but provides a projection into the future. Based on two key factors identified in this article – exceptionalism and differentiation through Russia’s opposition to the West, the ideas that Putin uses to articulate Russia’s identity have provided a solid, long-term base to justify the ongoing war in Ukraine. This war has given Putin a chance to demonstrate Russia’s ability to counteract the Western threat, re-establish Russia as a power center and also reinstate the stability of the regime domestically. The perception of the Ukrainian people as “brothers” presumes that both Russians and Ukrainians are part of the Slavic family and people. The implication and presumption of this discursive construct is that there is a “family bond” between the two which ensures its continuity throughout history and it is unbreakable regardless of the circumstances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
