| Abstrakt: |
There is more attention to Nazi law, but the extent to which these works address concerns about the legal academy's neglect for the Third Reich, the historical academy's disregard for Nazi law, and the prevalence of the rupture thesis, is open to question. In scholarship about Nazi law, phrases often used include that the regime "clothed itself with a tinsel of legal form,"[16] that Nazi law only instrumentalized or weaponized the law, that it undermined, abused, manipulated, debased or perverted the rule or law, that it was a pretence or façade of legality, that the 'dagger of the assassin was concealed beneath the robe of the jurist,'[17] or simply that the Nazi state was "lawless". Beyond this, while Whitman engages with some general historiography of the Third Reich well, for example employing Ian Kershaw's concept of "working towards the Führer" to highlight aspects of Nazi law (149), there is little engagement with the growing literature on Nazi law. The comparison of Nazi law with US race laws and the detailed re-application of the dual state model of Nazi law and its generalization to the authoritarian rule of law exemplify this, but some of the contributions to I Nazi Law i and the creation of a specific casebook for a Law and the Holocaust course also make some ground in this direction. [Extracted from the article] |
