| Autor: |
Dauber, Michael S. |
| Předmět: |
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| Zdroj: |
Dialogue (00122246); Oct2018, Vol. 61 Issue 1, p67-76, 10p |
| Abstrakt: |
Toby Svoboda argues that we ought to become revisionary moral expressivists if moral error theory is true. He claims we should do this because any suitable prescriptive theory proposed in response to error theory ought to 1) avoid moral error and 2) explain and preserve certain beneficial features of our current moral system. He believes revisionary moral expressivism accomplishes these tasks better than moral abolitionism, moral conservationism, or moral fictionalism. I believe he is too quick to dismiss moral fictionalism: several arguments available to fictionalists meet Svoboda's demands. I am also unconvinced that moral expressivism adequately explains moral disagreement [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Databáze: |
Supplemental Index |
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