| Autor: |
Vinu Kiran, S., Prasanna Devi, S., Manivannan, S. |
| Předmět: |
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| Zdroj: |
Procedia Computer Science; 2016, Vol. 87, p215-220, 6p |
| Abstrakt: |
In this paper, we propose to transform the global matching mechanism in an electronic exchange between the producers and consumers in the SCM system for perishable commodities over large scale data sets. Matching of of consumers and producers satisfactions are mathematically modeled based on preferential evaluations based on the bidding request and the requirements data which is supplied as a matrix to Gale Shapely matching algorithm. The matching works over a very transparent approach in a e-trading environment over large scale data. Since, Bigdata is involved; the global SCM could be much clearer and easier for allocation of perishable commodities. These matching outcomes are compared with the matching and profit ranges obtained using simple English auction method which results Pareto-optimal matches. We are observing the proposed method produces stable matching, which is preference-strategy proof with incentive compatibility for both consumers and producers. Our design involves the preference revelation or elicitation problem and the preference-aggregation problem. The preference revelation problem involves eliciting truthful information from the agents about their types that are used for computation of Incentive compatible results. We are using Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism design in our match-making settings where the agents’ preference types are multidimensional. This preserves profitability up to an additive loss that can be made arbitrarily small in polynomial time in the number of agents and the size of the agents’ type spaces. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Databáze: |
Supplemental Index |
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