| Abstrakt: |
The paper deals with the relationship of the British Diplomacy to the minority issues between 1938 and 1945 on the background of the so-called Czechoslovak Issue. Initially in Munich on 30th September 1938, Britain decided, having considered all wider implications of its appeasement policy, to support the solution of the minority issue subsisting in the forced surrendering of a part of the Czechoslovak territory settled primarily by the German minority for the benefit of Nazi Germany. Britain considered rather ineffective and inapplicable the system of minority treaties made under the auspices of the League of Nations. During WWII, supporting the restoration of Czechoslovakia within the frontiers of its pre-war territory, Britain was trying to find an alternative; since July 1942 the alternative was seen in the relocation of members of German minorities from Czechoslovakia, Poland (due to its Western borders) and from other countries in the Middle and Eastern Europe to Germany. This British approach was based upon several reasons besides their belief that the relocation of German population would strengthen the position of the respective states in Middle Europe, which could then cooperate in a federal union and effectively face the threat coming from the USSR as well as potentially from Germany in the future. In addition, the relocation would eliminate a possibility that German minorities could again become a threat to European peace. Another reason was the fact that, having analysed the whole problem, the British Foreign Office concluded that no "revival" of the system of minority treaties would be feasible after WWII. This was not only because the whole system failed during the War but also because Czechoslovakia, Poland and the USSR were strictly against its re-installation. On the other hand, the issue of the protection of minorities could not be eliminated; it was included in debates over the new conception of basic human rights within the preparation of a new international organization - the UNO. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
