| Abstrakt: |
This article presents a response by Paula England and Barbara Stanek Kilbourne to Debra Friedman and Carol Diem's comments on their article about rational choice theory, in the previous issue of the journal Rationality and Society. The article argued that rational choice theorists generally assume that individuals are selfish, that tastes are exogenous and stable, that interpersonal utility comparisons are impossible, and that individuals are rational. Friedman and Diem agree that a good theory should question each of the four assumptions. In criticizing the article, they contend that rational choice theory does not entail the assumptions that the authors claimed it does, and that the errors pointed out in rational choice theory do not flow from the androcentric notion of a separative self as was claimed that they do. The disagreement with Friedman and Diem is over whether rational choice theory assumes merely self-interest or whether the more restrictive assumption of selfishness is made. Friedman and Diem insist that rational choice theory assumes self-interest rather than selfishness, permits altruism, and does not assume a separative self. It was argued that self-interest is the formal assumption but that, in practice, many rational choice models implicitly or explicitly assume selfishness. |
