Autor: |
MAZALOV, VLADIMIR V., NOSALSKAYA, TATYANA E., TOKAREVA, JULIA S. |
Předmět: |
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Zdroj: |
International Game Theory Review; Jun2014, Vol. 16 Issue 2, p1-14, 14p |
Abstrakt: |
We present a multistage stochastic procedure that produces a fair allocation of a cake among n-person. In each step players observe the collection of the random offers (x1, ..., xn), where x1 + ⋯ + xn = 1. As the proposal emerged players have to make a decision to accept it or reject it. The final decision is defined by majority rule or by consensus. The optimal behavior of the players is derived as a class of threshold strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
Databáze: |
Complementary Index |
Externí odkaz: |
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