| Autor: |
Lindskold, Svenn, Bennett, Russell, Wayner, Marc |
| Zdroj: |
Behavioral Science; 1976, Vol. 21 Issue 1, p13-18, 6p |
| Abstrakt: |
Sixty female subjects opposed a simulated opponent in a modified prisoner's dilemma game. At first the subjects communicated threats of a ten-point penalty if the opponent did not cooperate. When subjects did penalize, the opponent could retaliate with 0, 5, 10, or 20 points. After the first penalty and retaliation, the opponent became the communicator and sent a series of honest promises of cooperation to the subject. As hypothesized, subjects whose penalties had been reciprocated with equal retaliation were more cooperative on the first block of promise trials than were 20-point or five-point subjects, but this effect dissipated, presumably because the opponent was not programed to reciprocate with a competitive choice if the promised cooperation was exploited. The opponent in the zero retaliation condition was not significantly less effective with conciliatory promises than the equal retaliation opponent. The study was discussed in terms of the starting and stabilizing functions of the norm of reciprocity in all levels of social systems and in terms of Osgood's graduated and reciprocal initiatives in tension reduction ( GRIT) proposal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Databáze: |
Complementary Index |
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