| Abstrakt: |
This article examines the origins of European competition policy. Whereas a new and influential view holds that German ordoliberal ideas were the driving force behind the emergence of that policy, I argue that such ideational explanations are theoretically unconvincing, methodologically biased and substantively wrong. Based on a careful observation of the most relevant actors' preferences, the terms of their interaction during the Paris negotiations of 1950–51, and the institutional context of their operations, I conclude that French planners' preferences, German reactions and US policy must all be examined together to produce a more convincing account of the emergence of the most supranational of all European policies. The finding that European competition policy emerged out of an acrimonious bargaining episode between pro-competition French bureaucrats and anti-competition German politicians points to the redistributive nature of European competition rules, and thereby severely challenges ideational theories, liberal-intergovernmentalism and delegation-for-credibility theories alike. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER] |
