| Abstrakt: |
All autocratic regimes face two dilemmas: first, they must deter potential elite rivals, and second, they must induce some form of political loyalty from the masses. How does a hegemonic party manage to solve elite disputes and keep the party united? Why would voters support an autocratic regime? To answer these questions, I present in this chapter my theory of hegemonic-party survival, which will be assessed using systematic empirical evidence in subsequent chapters of this book. Elite Divisions and the Golden Years of the PRI During the golden years of the PRI, the most serious threats came from within the party itself (Molinar, 1991). The PRI experienced a series of splits during its history, the most important of which were those of Juan Andreu Almazán in 1940, Ezequiel Padilla in 1946, Miguel Henríquez Guzmán in 1952, and Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas in 1988. All of these splits occurred because prominent politicians objected to the party's presidential nominee. The 1988 split was different because it resulted in the formation of a new political party, the PRD. To understand how a hegemonic party manages to deter party splits and the factors that account for elite divisiveness, consider the following decision-theoretic problem of a politician who is evaluating whether to remain loyal to the hegemonic party or to split. The expected utility of joining the hegemonic party is given by the probability of winning under that party's label, PI, multiplied by the likelihood of obtaining that party's nomination, NI, times the utility of office, O, minus the costs incurred in running a campaign under the incumbent's label, CI. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
