| Autor: |
Chalkias, K., Halkidis, S. T., Hristu-Varsakelis, D., Stephanides, G., Alexiadis, A. |
| Zdroj: |
Information Security & Cryptology (9783540794981); 2008, p108-122, 15p |
| Abstrakt: |
For two parties to communicate securely over an insecure channel, they must be able to authenticate one another and establish a common session key. We propose a new secure one-pass authenticated key establishment protocol which is well suited to one-way communication channels. The protocol is examined using an extension of the Bellare-Rogaway model proposed by Blake-Wilson et. al., and is shown to be provably secure, in the sense that defeating the protocol is equivalent to solving a CDH problem. We compare our protocol to existing approaches, in terms of security and efficiency. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the only one-pass protocol that resists general key-compromise impersonation attacks, and avoids certain vulnerabilities to loss of information attacks found in other protocols of its class. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Databáze: |
Complementary Index |
| Externí odkaz: |
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