Information aggregation and preference heterogeneity in committees.

Autor:	Schulte, Elisabeth
Předmět:	COMMITTEES PREFERENCE heterogeneity DECISION making VOTING COMMUNICATION
Zdroj:	Theory & Decision; Jul2010, Vol. 69 Issue 1, p97-118, 22p, 1 Diagram, 2 Graphs
Abstrakt:	This paper is concerned with the efficiency of information aggregation in a committee whose members have heterogeneous preferences over a binary decision variable. We study a voting game with a pre-vote communication stage and identify conditions under which full information aggregation is possible. In particular, if preferences are common knowledge and each committee member is endowed with information, full information aggregation is possible despite preference heterogeneity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Databáze:	Complementary Index
Externí odkaz:	Zobrazit plný text záznamu Full text from SpringerLink