| Autor: |
Guymon, Ronald N., Balakrishnan, Ramji, Tubbs, Richard M. |
| Předmět: |
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| Zdroj: |
Journal of Management Accounting Research; 2008 Supplement, Vol. 20, p1-18, 18p, 2 Diagrams, 2 Charts, 1 Graph |
| Abstrakt: |
We extend Fisher et al. (2003) to investigate the effectiveness of a budget-based incentive contract to settings with alternate task characteristics. We first replicate their finding: when groups perform a task with an additive production function, a budget-based contract leads to higher levels of performance than a piece-rate contract. However , we do not find higher performance when we modify the task to be interdependent, arguably a key feature of group tasks. We also show that goal commitment mediates the incentive contract-performance relation for tasks with an additive production function. Collectively, these results suggest that variations in production technology influence the relative motivational effectiveness of different incentive plans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Databáze: |
Complementary Index |
| Externí odkaz: |
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