| Autor: |
Rosenberg, Isaac B. |
| Předmět: |
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| Zdroj: |
Public Contract Law Journal; Winter2008, Vol. 37 Issue 2, p271-302, 32p, 2 Charts |
| Abstrakt: |
This note considers whether the interaction of whistleblower protections and incentives provided by the False Claims Act and the disclosure requirements of the recently enacted Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 transform qui tam relators' investigatory conduct into unconstitutional government searches. Applying several prevailing theories of state action, this note argues that these factors can and likely do transform relator conduct into government action with unsettling consequences: personal liability for relators and suppressibility of relator-collected evidence. Both consequences undermine the purpose of the False Claims Act by deterring those sought for help from coming to the Government's aid and by severely diminishing the value of relators' efforts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Databáze: |
Complementary Index |
| Externí odkaz: |
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