| Autor: |
Xu, Cheng, Bertrand, Jacques |
| Předmět: |
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| Zdroj: |
Democratization; Jan2025, Vol. 32 Issue 1, p146-165, 20p |
| Abstrakt: |
When rebel groups transition to electoral parties and participate in the democratic process, the prospects of peace are often fragile. We argue that rebel parties' capacity to effectively participate in the electoral arena and contribute to post-conflict stability is contingent on the nature and legacies of the wartime competitive field. Where rebels and politicians shared claims of representation over their constituents in wartime, we argue that elections-related violence is likely in postwar elections when the rebels transition towards political parties. These former rebel parties challenges established electoral holds of political actors who previously represented the community at the ballot box while collaborating with insurgents. The transformation from wartime allies to direct electoral competition creates new incentives for violence, especially where violence is already normalized. Conversely, where established politicians maintain hegemonic representation of their constituency, they create strong barriers to entry for former insurgents in the electoral realm. As a result, the incentives for violence are much reduced. We analyse the Moro Islamic Liberation Front's transformation into the United Bangsamoro Justice Party after the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Databáze: |
Complementary Index |
| Externí odkaz: |
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