| Abstrakt: |
This paper investigates the usefulness of applying the lessons of the Artemis Accords ("Accords") to the nuclear arms regime - specifically asking whether strategic soft law agreements could create a stop gap for the shortcomings of long held nuclear arms agreements.1 To do so, it explores multiple instruments of international law, their uses in the existing nuclear and space frameworks, and how that may inform future actions for security or arms agreements. In conclusion, it is determined that the approach developed by the Accords may benefit future nuclear arms communications. The Accords bring many states to the table, largely underscoring mutually accepted existing international law while subtly and incrementally expanding it. The responding criticism of the Accords is just as healthy to the process as praise, because it keeps the dialogue in motion - and this is the success of soft law. While lacking in legal might, the ease of its creation is its superpower. Creating consistent and constant communication helps build predictability and trust, which is a recipe for a more secure world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
