Are There "Aesthetic" Judgments?

Autor: Sackris, David C, Larsen, Rasmus Rosenberg
Předmět:
Zdroj: Erkenntnis; Dec2024, Vol. 89 Issue 8, p2985-3003, 19p
Abstrakt: In philosophy of aesthetics, scholars commonly express a commitment to the premise that there is a distinctive type of judgment that can be meaningfully labeled "aesthetic", and that these judgments are distinctively different from other types of judgments. We argue that, within an Aristotelian framework, there is no clear avenue for meaningfully differentiating "aesthetic" judgment from other types of judgment, and, as such, we aim to question the assumption that aesthetic judgment does in fact constitute a distinctive kind of judgment that is in need of, or can be subject to, distinctive theorizing. We advance our argument primarily through demonstrating that leading contemporary accounts of aesthetic judgment do not successfully distinguish a type of judgment in that they do not tell us how making an aesthetic judgment differs substantially from judging that 2 + 3 = 5, that football is entertaining, or that today is Tuesday. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Databáze: Complementary Index