Abstrakt: |
Introduction: Seyyed Ahmad Barelvi is one of the few revolutionary Sufis of the Indian subcontinent who transformed his political thought from theory to practice through jihad and armed uprising. Barelvi's political thought was not unrelated to the crises and disorders of his time. The central issue of this article is the relationship between Sayyid Ahmad Barelvi's political thought and the crises and disorders of his era. The core question of this inquiry is: according to Sayyid Ahmad Barelvi, what were the crises facing the society of the Indian subcontinent at that time, what did he consider their roots and causes, and what was his ideal political order and the solutions he prescribed for overcoming these crises? Methods: This article employs Thomas Spragens' "crisis theory" model as the theoretical framework and research methodology to explain Sayyid Ahmad Barelvi's political thought. Spragens developed his method to uncover and understand the "inner logic" of political theory. According to him, every political theory emerges from the crisis of its time, considering the current state (what is) and the desired state (what ought to be). Spriggans believes that the great art of a political theory is to provide a way to integrate the "what is" with the "what ought to be." Results and discussion: Sayyid Ahmad perceived the political powers of his time as being in conflict with his theoretical foundations and value system as a Muslim. Additionally, the contemporary political systems were acquiring power illegitimately, and the Islamic political order was gradually losing its ability to sustain itself. Therefore, by contemplating concepts such as Imamate, Jihad, and governance, he sought to pave the way for a transformation in the political order and a legitimate transfer of power. This set of efforts came to be known as "Tariqat-i-Muhammadiya" (the Mohammadian Way). Ultimately, although "Tariqat-i-Muhammadiya" failed to establish a new order and implement a legitimate governance based on its politico-religious principles, it was somewhat successful in delegitimizing and discrediting the "right to rule" of colonial and despotic powers. Barelvi was ultimately defeated due to the greed and betrayal of certain Pashtun leaders who disregarded his directives for a principled jihad. Barelvi's concept of jihad entailed a specific understanding of warfare that was incompatible with material goals aimed at collecting spoils. These principles effectively imposed constraints on his fighters, who were primarily from the Pashtun tribes. The Pashtun leaders rejected these constraints, abandoned Barelvi's principles of jihad, and instead focused on accumulating war spoils. The Pashtuns' strong desire for booty created the first rift in Sayyid Ahmad's movement. Subsequently, this rift expanded to other issues, such as the incompatibility between Sayyid Ahmad's orthodox principles and the tribal traditions of the Pashtuns, leading to the failure of Barelvi's movement. Despite this, the 'Tariqat-i Muhammadiyya' movement had a significant religious impact on contemporary Islamic movements and notably influenced the Taliban in Afghanistan both militarily and politically. Conclusion: According to Barelvi, the main crises are categorized as "political" and "religious." He considers the root of these crises to be "shirk" (polytheism) and "kufr" (disbelief). Barelvi's ideal political order involves eradicating polytheism and disbelief, elevating the word of God, reviving the Quran and the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad, and establishing a native Islamic state. His practical solution to resolve these crises and transition from the current state to the desired state involves the continuous implementation of "military jihad." However, ultimately, Sayyid Ahmad Barelvi fails in the execution of his strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |