| Abstrakt: |
Preventive deployment as a conflict prevention tool has not recurred in the past several decades, despite the broadly acclaimed success of the United Nations Preventive Deployment in Macedonia, UNPREDEP 1995-1999, and of its predecessor missions, UNPROFOR/Macedonia, and UNPROFOR/M 1992-1995. The United Nations in particular has continued with mainly first- and second-generation peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding actions even on civilizational borders. What may best explain why there has been no other engagement in preventive deployment missions? There has been much emphasis placed formally and informally on early warning, detection, mitigation, and prevention of conflict. There have also been increasing numbers of violent conflicts worldwide, so again, why no more preventive deployments? Realism, organizational learning and constructivism offer potential theoretical insights. To weigh this, we should separate the main organizations involved (the UN Headquarters) and the field organization (UNPREDEP), conceived of as two separate entities; consider examination of the case, expanding it temporally; and weigh lastly, theoretical approaches infrequently utilized in international relations, particularly organization and organizational learning theory. We may conclude that learning and knowledge interactions between organizations (especially between the field and UN Headquarters) resulted in flawed processes and outcomes at headquarters. Thereby blurred opportunities for understanding, learning, and change at the very least marginalized preventive deployment as a viable tool for pre-conflict management. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
