| Abstrakt: |
If we could build artificial persons (APs) with a moral status comparable to this of a typical human being, how should we design those APs in the right way? This question has been addressed mainly in terms of designing APs devoted to being servants (AP servants) and debated in reference to their autonomy and the harm they might experience. Recently, it has been argued that even if developing AP servants would neither deprive them of autonomy nor cause any net harm, then developing such entities would still be unethical due to the manipulative attitude of their designers. I make two contributions to this discussion. First, I claim that the argument about manipulative attitude significantly shifts the perspective of the whole discussion on APs and that it refers to a much wider range of types of APs than has been acknowledged. Second, I investigate the possibilities of developing APs without a manipulative attitude. I proceed in the following manner: (1) I examine the argument about manipulativeness; (2) show the important novelty it brings to a discussion about APs; (3) analyze how the argument can be extrapolated to designing other kinds of Aps; and (4) discuss cases in which APs can be designed without manipulativeness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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