| Autor: |
Seymour, Amy |
| Předmět: |
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| Zdroj: |
Analytic Philosophy; Jun2024, Vol. 65 Issue 2, p187-202, 16p |
| Abstrakt: |
Bailey (2021) offers a clever argument for the compatibility of determinism and moral responsibility based on the nature of intrinsic intentions. The argument is mistaken on two counts. First, it is invalid. Second, even setting that first point aside, the argument proves too much: we would be blameworthy in paradigm cases of non‐blameworthiness. I conclude that we cannot reason from intentions to responsibility solely from the "inside out"—our possessing a blameworthy intention cannot tell us whether this intention is also blameworthy in deterministic worlds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Databáze: |
Complementary Index |
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