| Abstrakt: |
To help explain in a principled way why criminal law doctrine tends to abstract away from motives and other individualized circumstances, I have defended an insufficient regard theory of criminal culpability that is more objective in certain respects than other views in the same camp. This has led Alec Walen to object that my view is too objective to be an account of culpability and is better understood as a theory of criminal wrongs. This challenge is important not least because it requires getting clearer about what wrongness and culpability are and what roles they play on a legal moralist picture of the criminal law. Here, I argue that Walen's objection is mistaken. Once we get clearer on what distinguishes wrongness and culpability, it becomes clear that my account is best seen as a theory of culpability. This is so even though it calculates degrees of culpability in a more objective way than other insufficient regard views. Besides just defending my account from Walen's objection, this paper aims to make a positive contribution by developing a more sophisticated version of the Manifestation Account I proposed earlier. To do this, I focus on the main area of criminal law doctrine where culpability comes apart from wrongness – namely, excuse cases. My earlier Manifestation Account is implausible – or at least limited – because it has nothing distinctive to say about how to determine the culpability of excused misconduct. Accordingly, the theory would be, if not outright false, at best incompatible with the orthodox view in criminal law theory, which takes excuses to accept wrongdoing but deny culpability. To solve this problem and enhance the Manifestation Account's explanatory value, I show how to extend the theory to account for the culpability of wrongs where a putatively excusing condition is in play. This not only fills a gap in the Manifestation Account but has the further benefit of providing a unified reasons-based account of the main categories of misconduct in the criminal law, which shows what separates criminal wrongness from culpability both in justification cases and excuse cases. The hope is that this effort will shed light on the distinct roles of wrongness and culpability in legal moralist theories of the criminal law and provide a better understanding of degrees of culpability for criminal wrongs – not only when justifications are at issue, but also when excuses are involved. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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