| Abstrakt: |
In the *Vajracchedikāṭīkā, while commenting on a specific passage of the Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā, Kamalaśīla presents a refutation of the Self (ātman). As is well known, the Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā is one of the most important sūtras of the Buddhist Mahāyāna tradition and concerns the correct practice for those who proceed in the path of a Bodhisattva. In this article, I shall analyze a portion of Kamalaśīla's refutation, based on a new critical edition and English translation of the *Vajracchedikāṭīkā. I will show how he takes the opportunity, while commenting on scriptures, to combine logic/epistemology and soteriology. He does this by including philosophical arguments in his explanation of the cultivation of insight, and accordingly within the spiritual path of a Bodhisattva. In the process, I shall also investigate sources containing disputes between Buddhists and Naiyāyikas (as well as Vaiśeṣikas) regarding the Self. These are evidently the background of Kamalaśīla's refutation. In particular, he defends the so-called Buddhist non-apprehension argument against Uddyotakara's doctrine of the perceptibility of the Self. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
