| Abstrakt: |
Since 2013, China has undertaken extensive reclamation and construction on several reefs in the Spratly Island chain in the South China Sea. China has since been adding new construction and fortifications to the land features that had undergone reclamation between late 2013 and 2015, but none of the new projects rivalled the large-scale reclamation from 2014–15, and nor has China reclaimed any new land features. Land reclamation has theoretical and empirical implications. The literature regarding maritime disputes in the South China Sea is rich and plenty. Many studies, however, focus on China's bilateral assertive or coercive behaviour as well as China's general strategy in the South China Sea, not land reclamation per se. What explains the timing of China's large-scale land reclamation in the South China Sea? Why did China decide to initiate large-scale land reclamation in the first place? This paper, therefore, conducts a comprehensive case study analysing China's land reclamation decisions. I argue that China's land reclamation is a result of capability, rationale, and opportunities which include a calculation of U.S. resolve. This study has implications for understanding Chinese foreign policy decision-making and contributes to the credibility debate in the coercion literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
