| Abstrakt: |
Most relations among states are asymmetric due to a disparity of capacities. This does not mean the strong can crush the weak at will, as the cost could outweigh the gain. If the weaker side sees an issue as more important than the stronger side, the former is likely to invest more attention into building a more robust will and tougher stance against the pressure at hand. However, China's South China Sea (SCS) policy and neighbouring states' responses to it demonstrate another scenario: small states may lose the advantages of heightened attention if the great power shifts its focus onto the same issue, dedicating more political resources to it. This represents a missing piece in the established theory of asymmetric politics. The present article examines pertinent policy adjustments by the Philippines and Vietnam before and after Chinese diplomacy gravitated towards prioritising the SCS from 2014 to 2016, especially after the 2016 Arbitration. I argue that, with the US increasingly presence in the region, China's attention shift to the SCS reflects Beijing's decision to put more diplomatic resources and time into forming a consistent strategy to replace its uncoordinated policies out of the inattention, which previously motivated small states to make significant policy adjustments in response. In analysing Philippine and the Vietnamese stances on the South China Sea, I gauge the reasons for the two countries' policy changes from a proactive stance in internationalising the issue to a low-profile posture as an attempt to mend fences with China after the attention shift. Hence, this study aims to reveal the motives behind small states' policy adjustments, as well as to expand the explanatory scope of the theory of asymmetric attention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
