| Abstrakt: |
Elite cohesion structures interethnic bargaining and institutional design in post-conflict divided societies. Although works have explored how interethnic elite bargaining affects institutional design and conflict and cooperation in multiethnic states, less attention has been paid to historical antecedents that precondition bargaining strategies and outcomes in post-conflict spaces. This article explores elite bargaining dynamics among Iraqi dissident and exiled elites prior to 2003 to explain fractionalization and incongruent institutional design following regime change. Treating elite interactions as antecedent conditions for explaining statebuilding outcomes, it situates Iraq's informal consociational power-sharing institutional design, muhassasa, within preceding patterns of interethnic fragmentation of the anti-Ba'thist opposition movement prior to 2003. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with dissident elites from Iraq's pre-2003 opposition and exiled groups and American policymakers, this paper illustrates how ethnic elite competition for control and state capture impeded the adoption and design of consensual and durable power-sharing institutions following regime change. Thus, although collective grievances with Ba'thist-era exclusion and repression facilitated interethnic mobilization among disparate elite, expedient statebuilding and the reliance on fractionalized opposition groups obstructed the development and evolution of a cohesive, durable, and inclusive conflict mitigating institutional design after 2003. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
