| Autor: |
Yamaguchi, Yohei, Yahagi, Ken |
| Předmět: |
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| Zdroj: |
Journal of Theoretical Politics; Jan2024, Vol. 36 Issue 1, p3-36, 34p |
| Abstrakt: |
Why is criminal law enforcement increasingly punitive, despite that the situation has improved for decades? This paper investigates this question from the perspective of political misinformation. To this end, we develop a law enforcement model with political competition and examine how political parties' campaigns affect voters' perceptions of crime and equilibrium law enforcement policy. In a political campaign stage, we show that one political party has an incentive to overstate the severity of crime, while the other party has an incentive to correct voters' beliefs. However, although the two parties attempt to change voters' beliefs in opposite directions, we find that the total effect of a political campaign is more likely to drive both parties' policies in a harsh direction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Databáze: |
Complementary Index |
| Externí odkaz: |
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