| Autor: |
Reynolds, Molly E., Hanson, Peter C. |
| Předmět: |
|
| Zdroj: |
Forum (2194-6183); Jul2023, Vol. 21 Issue 2, p213-238, 26p |
| Abstrakt: |
Scholars commonly observe that lawmaking in Congress has transitioned from the textbook system of "regular order" in which power was decentralized in committees and lawmaking followed a formal process to one of "unorthodox lawmaking" characterized by the centralization of power in party leaders and a lack of formal process. It is debated whether this change marks a decline in Congress's lawmaking capacity, or is a procedural adaptation that has allowed Congress to remain productive despite high levels of partisanship. In this article, we maintain that lawmaking in Congress varies along two dimensions: formality of process and centralization of power. We analyze non-spending bills added to omnibus appropriations packages to demonstrate that lawmaking on these bills is informal and decentralized. Rank-and-file members retain a capacity to place matters on the legislative agenda and authorizing committees retain gatekeeping and policymaking authority. The process through which add-ons are approved is also bipartisan. Our findings demonstrate that this style of lawmaking is a procedural adaptation used by members to pass legislation important to their districts and in which committees continue to play an important deliberative role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Databáze: |
Complementary Index |
| Externí odkaz: |
|
