| Abstrakt: |
The aim of this study was to suggest a model of governors' performance during the imposed war between Iran and Iraq. The approach is phenomenological, and the data was gathered through semi-structured interview and personal data from the participants who were involved during the war. After 10 interviews, the data was saturated, which were fed into MAXQDA and analyzed through Collaizi method. The validity of the findings was reviewed by the participants and confirmed through reference to the historical documents. The findings showed that ideology was very effective on the agency of the governors during the war. They referred to providing machines, equipment, ammunition, and logistics of the war. Some of their lived experience was managing war-damaged people and migrants, financial support and damage control, security of the bombarded areas, supporting the soldiers' spirit, teaching and missioning the forces, informing people and the higher commanders. These lived experiences indicated a focus and coherence within the power structure benefiting from people's support at the time. The religious body of the society could finish the war through people's organization despite the foreign economic sanctions and constant attack from the Iraqi forces. They could prevent the fall of the revolution and defeat through eight-year military and economic sanctions, accepting the united nations resolution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
