CEO Pay Components and Aggressive Non-GAAP Earnings Disclosure.

Autor: Black, Dirk E., Black, Ervin L., Christensen, Theodore E., Gee, Kurt H.
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Zdroj: Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance; Jul2023, Vol. 38 Issue 3, p648-675, 28p, 8 Charts, 2 Graphs
Abstrakt: We examine the relation between CEO pay components and aggressive non-GAAP earnings disclosures using CEO pay components as proxies for managers' short- versus long-term focus. Specifically, we explore the extent to which short-term bonus plan payouts and long-term incentive plan payouts are associated with: (1) Managers' propensity to exclude expense items in excess of those excluded by equity analysts; and, (2) The magnitude of those incremental exclusions. We find that long-term incentive plan payouts are negatively associated with the likelihood and magnitude of aggressive non-GAAP exclusions. Our results are consistent with managers reporting non-GAAP information less aggressively when they are more focused on long-term, rather than short-term, value. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Databáze: Complementary Index
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