| Abstrakt: |
Most utilities were integrated monopolies at the beginning of the electricity industry, either investor (mainly in the United States) or publicly owned. However, since the 1980s, many power markets have shifted from traditional to competitive environments. Profit maximization is more important than cost reduction in the new economic models. However, competitive electrical markets do not exist in practice because there is concentration in a reduced number of firms. In other words, power markets are organized as oligopolies, and the action of one of the agents can dramatically influence market variables. Given the above, it proposes a basic two states game in a dupolist market integrating real options and a game theory framework to analyze strategic investment in the power markets and the effects of endogenous competition. First, it calculates the real value option for each firm, assuming that these are priceacceptance (Cournot competence) with a lineal inverse demand function in relation quantity. Then, this paper develops the competitive game characteristics for the cost function of each firm. Results show that exists several market structure possibilities for variations of demand (up or down) competition leads to early exercise and aggressive investment behaviors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
