| Abstrakt: |
This essays considers the hypothesis that Indian epistemology does not clearly recognize, let alone emphasize, an intellectual faculty that apprehends intelligible things, such as essences or "truths of reason," or elevate knowledge of such things to a status higher than that of sense perception. Evidence for this hypothesis from various sources, including Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Nyāya, and Buddhist logic-epistemological writings, is examined. Special attention is given to a passage from Kumārila's Ślokavārttika, Pratyakṣasūtra chapter, where he argues that the senses directly perceive existence. Kumārila's view is contrasted to Plato's, in the Theaetetus, that existence is the object, not of the senses, but the soul (psychē). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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