Autor: |
ABAKEDI, Dominic Effiong, ARICHE, Chrisantus Kanayochukwu |
Předmět: |
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Zdroj: |
Hermeneia: Journal of Hermeneutics, Art Theory & Criticism; 2022, Issue 28, p5-13, 9p |
Abstrakt: |
This paper disagrees with Nick Zangwill over the metaphysical status of logic. Using the method of critical analysis, the paper argues that philosophers have always treated the objects of the world as entities that are mind-and-languageindependent. Therefore, Zangwill‟s description of conjunction (˄) and disjunction (˅) as well as the unary operator called negation ( ) as concrete worldly facts, is tantamount to situating them in the same metaphysical category as things-inthemselves. Raising the question whether this augurs well for the function of logic as a descriptive tool, the paper responds in the negative and argues that it gives rise to what the authors have tagged the paradox of inconsistent metaphysical categorization. The paper concludes that searching for a preconceived essence for logic should be discouraged because logic is not one but many, and because doing so forces one to locate logic or its features in a metaphysical category that generates paradoxes and undermines the function of logic as the mind‟s tool of description. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
Databáze: |
Complementary Index |
Externí odkaz: |
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