| Autor: |
Bischi, Gian Italo, Favaretto, Federico, Carrera, Edgar J. Sanchez |
| Zdroj: |
Journal of Economic Interaction & Coordination; Jan2022, Vol. 17 Issue 1, p349-377, 29p |
| Abstrakt: |
Why is populism emerging now in Europe? Why is it present in USA and Latin America? What model of political choice may explain these facts? Our paper addresses these questions by building an evolutionary game with two groups of players that decide whether to support a populist party by weighting demand for redistribution and demand for tough policy against immigration. Fundamentally, it is assumed that agents care about immigration the more they fear it and the higher number of other people care about it. Overall, positive shifts in the fear of immigration and increases in inequality drive citizens to converge toward supporting populists. The stability of the equilibria depends on the crucial parameters of the model, namely: fear of immigrants, the effect that the population type (the number of citizens supporting populism) have on individual preferences, economic inequality. Different equilibria represent different cases of populism: South-American left-wing populism and European right-wing populism. We propose that an economic society with a low inequality of wealth and with a low fear of immigrants is needed to avoid populism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Databáze: |
Complementary Index |
| Externí odkaz: |
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