Autor: |
Kempf, Robin J., Sampath, Vijay S., Lu, Elaine Yi, Shapiro, David M. |
Předmět: |
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Zdroj: |
Public Integrity; Jan/Feb 2022, Vol. 24 Issue 1, p51-65, 15p, 3 Charts, 1 Graph |
Abstrakt: |
This exploratory research examines whether the proliferation of state offices of inspector general (OIGs) contributes to corruption control. Using 50-state panel data from 1976 to 2010, preliminary evidence that the number of state-level OIGs is positively associated with the corruption conviction rate is shown. This suggests that state OIGs act as a successful corruption detection mechanism, and therefore, OIGs play a role in corruption control, working to help keep the government accountable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
Databáze: |
Complementary Index |
Externí odkaz: |
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