| Autor: |
Bartels, Brandon L., Kramon, Eric |
| Předmět: |
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| Zdroj: |
American Journal of Political Science (John Wiley & Sons, Inc.); Jan2022, Vol. 66 Issue 1, p171-186, 16p |
| Abstrakt: |
Supreme Court job approval is sensibly connected to its decisions, particularly salient ones. We fill a gap in the literature by theorizing—via a presidential appointment mechanism—how partisan alignment with the incumbent president (presidential copartisanship) influences Supreme Court job approval. Analysis of data from 1986 to 2019 (supplemented by longer‐term confidence data) shows that a president's copartisans are significantly more approving of the Court than outpartisans. Analysis of the American Panel Survey surrounding high‐salience events during the transition from Obama to Trump shows that Republicans, who significantly increase in Court approval following Trump's election victory, are anticipatory of Trump's prospects of changing the Court. Democrats, whose approval significantly declines only after Justice Gorsuch's confirmation, are not anticipatory but reactive to the president's confirmed appointee. Our findings generate new evidence of how the president structures public opinion toward the Court, which has important implications for judicial independence and legitimacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Databáze: |
Complementary Index |
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