| Abstrakt: |
American states have underinvested in public higher education for decades, spurring tuition increases that have in turn fueled an unprecedented rise in student debt. Most scholars have looked to ideology and partisanship to help explain this trend. However, existing studies have yet to provide a satisfactory account of why states led by both parties have exhibited the same spending patterns. This Article argues that to understand retrenchment, scholars must scrutinize the laws that shape legislators' budget choices. Through comparative histories of California and Virginia, interviews with eighteen state policymakers, and quantitative data, this analysis shows that decreased funding for public colleges and universities can be traced to three legal constructs: competing health, K-12 education, and prison expenditure mandates; outdated and inefficient tax systems; and campaign finance and lobbying rules that have allowed wealthy interests to overwhelm college advocates' voices. These findings should encourage scholars to examine the unintended consequences that legal frameworks governing one policy area can have on another. The results also have important implications for those wishing to revitalize public higher education: reformers should shift their focus from individual elections and budget battles to structural changes, beginning with revisions to state laws guiding appropriations, taxation, and political participation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
