| Abstrakt: |
It is worth noting that U.S.-based threat intelligence companies avoid openly attributing cyber operations to the USG.[82] However, the cyber operations tracker at CFR states that "[n]ineteen countries are suspected of sponsoring cyber operations, including the United States", and that of the state-sponsored incidents, 22 were recorded as being sponsored at least in part, by the USG.[83] There are several possible explanations for the small number of U.S. observations. Political attribution is also difficult since political motives are not always clear and can be purposely obscured to create confusion.[21] For example, states regularly use proxy and nongovernment actors to conduct cyber operations, with these actors being directed, controlled, and monitored by official state authorities to varying degrees.[22] The relevant government might be aware of these operations and thus might bear some legal or other responsibility to prevent them, but might also be able to create sufficient distance to muddy a judgment.[23] Indeed, states might even benefit from the plausible deniability that these dynamics create - see, for example, Russian denials that they were responsible for the 2007 Estonian distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack, claiming that these were patriotic hackers rather than officials acting on behalf of the Russian government. In effect, "The actions of private firms here effectively usurp what had been previously the exclusive prerogative of the state in ways that are not easily evaluated."[77] One consequence of this may be that victims, media, and even foreign governments will increasingly look to private-sector companies for assistance and information, and not see the USG as a valuable resource of information, thereby sidelining the USG's role and prominence in attribution of cyber incidents. [Extracted from the article] |
