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Hadot contends that these features of ancient texts make next to no sense if their authors had intended them for publication on anything like our understanding of philosophical writing.[11] Hadot recognises that the term "spiritual exercises" is potentially contentious, echoing as it does a title from Ignatius Loyola within a specifically Christian, religious context.[12] Nevertheless, Hadot explains that none of the other possible adjectives he considered could capture the full range of what was in play in the exercises at issue. This paper brings Julia Annas' work on virtues as skills to the interpretation of Pierre Hadot's metaphilosophical claims concerning the philosophies of antiquity. 49 See Annas, I Intelligent Virtue i , 16-25. 50 Annas, I Intelligent Virtue i , 16-25. 51 Annas, I Intelligent Virtue i , 4, 12-13. 52 Annas, I Intelligent Virtue i , 18 (italics ours). Concluding Remarks on Reading Hadot After Annas By applying to what Pierre Hadot calls spiritual exercises Julia Annas' central claims concerning virtue as a skill, we have been able to show that there is nothing intrinsically mysterious, supra- or irrational about these exercises, either in themselves or as they are described by Hadot. [Extracted from the article] |
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