Abstrakt: |
This paper argues that the BRICS are status quo powers concerning two core norms of the international society: sovereignty and hierarchy, what conditions both the scope and depth of their security cooperation. On the one hand, this enables cooperation, as they can use the group to protect these norms and reinforce state control on transnational flows. In addition, this facilitates the formation of ties among foreign policy and bureaucratic elites across the BRICS who share a preference for protecting these norms. On the other hand, the importance attached to these norms constrains cooperation: differences of regime type are associated to higher levels of distrust; and intragroup power asymmetries raise fears of potential unequal agreements. The paper then applies these ideas to indicate the potential for cooperation on anti‐drug and cybersecurity policies. On the one hand, different regime types and power inequalities are likely to hinder cooperation. On the other hand, interests from foreign policy, political and bureaucratic elites in protecting norms, as well as in increasing state control on transnational flows and expand repression against new threats are likely to facilitate cooperation. Without an adequate governance, surveillance systems could deteriorate into espionage or restriction of political and civil liberties, especially in a context of authoritarian or proto‐authoritarian governments in the largest BRICS. Furthermore, technological asymmetries between China and the other BRICS are likely to produce agreements in which a few of the BRICS might struggle even to consume cybersecurity technologies, let alone to produce them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |