| Abstrakt: |
This article analyses proportionality as a potential element of a theory of morally justified surveillance, and sets out a teleological account. It draws on conceptions in criminal justice ethics and just war theory, defines teleological proportionality in the context of surveillance, and sketches some of the central values likely to go into the consideration. It then explores some of the ways in which deontologists might want to modify the account. Specifically, it reviews the idea that the set of goods should be restricted, that proportionality should require a surplus of good, and that there should be both an upper and a lower-bound on the badness of proportional surveillance. Each of these ideas is shown to raise severe difficulties. Finally, the article considers whether to adopt a narrow or a wide proportionality condition, reviews an argument for the former, and concludes in favour of the latter. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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