| Autor: |
Hermansen, Silje Synnøve Lyder |
| Předmět: |
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| Zdroj: |
Journal of European Public Policy; Aug2020, Vol. 27 Issue 8, p1215-1235, 21p |
| Abstrakt: |
Does the President of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) make strategic use of his members? Cases in the CJEU are prepared by a 'judge-rapporteur' who acts as an agenda setter. I argue that the President builds the Court's legitimacy by strategically allocating cases to select judges. Using original data on 9623 case allocations (1980–2015), I argue that suspicions about judges' political accountability can polarize already politicized debates. The President circumvents such dynamics by appointing a rapporteur whose government holds moderate political preferences. However, politics are relevant mainly when case law is not yet developed. The need for consistency also contributes to explain judges individual-level specialization, which arguably favors the construction of a coherent case law. The results speak to the lingering effect of judges' renewable terms – despite secret voting – as well as the importance of courts' internal organization for judicial independence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Databáze: |
Complementary Index |
| Externí odkaz: |
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