MAXIMUM RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE AND RETAILER CARTEL PROFITS: EVIDENCE FROM THE INDIAN PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY.

Autor:	BHASKARABHATLA, AJAY
Předmět:	PRICE maintenance RESALE CARTELS PHARMACEUTICAL industry ANTITRUST law TRADE associations
Zdroj:	Antitrust Law Journal; 2020, Vol. 83 Issue 1, p41-73, 33p, 1 Chart, 7 Graphs
Abstrakt:	In this article, the author examine how India's treatment of maximum resale price maintenance and facilitates cartelization in the pharmaceutical industry. It mentions jurisdictions featuring relatively friendlier legal treatment towards RPM can be instructive in revealing potential anticompetitive effects. It also mentions trade associations of retailers and manufacturers guide them during periods of bargaining challenges.
Databáze:	Complementary Index
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