| Autor: |
Alassad, Mustafa, Davarikia, Hamzeh, Chan, Yupo |
| Předmět: |
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| Zdroj: |
Applied Sciences (2076-3417); Jun2020, Vol. 10 Issue 11, p3870, 17p |
| Abstrakt: |
Oil-and-gas networks are systems of pumps and pipelines that are exposed to heterogeneous threats. Accordingly, hardening strategies against malicious attacks are needed in today's geopolitical climate. In this paper, a tri-level leader–follower–operator game is established for determining the optimal fortification tactics to protect the critical assets considering the petroleum firm limited resources. We additionally consider defender options beyond outright fortification including tactics often adapted in the fog of war, such as deception. These are mathematically modeled under shared cognition concepts. The proposed model assumes a trial-and-error learning process to gradually discover effective defense strategies. These strategies may include a network defender projecting false information in the media or on the front lines to deceive the aggressor. The resulting mixed-integer nonlinear programming problem is decomposed into a master problem associated with deception and sub-problem as response strategies. A column-and-constraint generation solution duly takes into account the defender–operator and attacker–operator interactions. Further, linearization techniques are applied to reformulate the problem into a mixed-integer linear problem. Our studies performed on the part of the Iraq oil-and-gas network and computational results verified that the deception concept is much more effective than fortification, where the cost of attackers damages diminished significantly without substantial resources commitment on the part of the defender. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Databáze: |
Complementary Index |
| Externí odkaz: |
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