| Autor: |
Da Silva, Michael |
| Předmět: |
|
| Zdroj: |
Journal of Value Inquiry; Jun2020, Vol. 54 Issue 2, p289-307, 19p |
| Abstrakt: |
Call the disjunctive claim that all rights must conform to SC, a special story is required to justify non-SC-compliant rights that is not required for SC-compliant rights, or SC-compliant rights are morally primary to non-SC-compliant ones the "default claim". All proponents must explain why new data on legal rights should not be addressed in our analysis of rights and why claimed non-SC conforming moral rights are not really rights in a non-question begging manner. Perhaps the most persuasive explanation of a necessary connection between legal and moral rights notes that the term "right" has legal origins and states that legal and moral rights' shared roots in a Roman law term makes them analogues.[65] Yet analogues need not have the same formal structure. Even Tony Honoré, who details how historical rights developed from a common historical antecedent, grants that analogous concepts can develop differently.[66] A further story of continued joint development of legal and moral rights is needed to fully explain why an SC-compliant default should continue to be recognized even if the original Roman term referred exclusively to an SC-compliant entity - which is hardly so in the historical record.[67] This story would also need to explain why the public law development of non-SC-compliant rights was illegitimate in a non-ad hoc fashion. [Extracted from the article] |
| Databáze: |
Complementary Index |
| Externí odkaz: |
|
Full text from SpringerLink