| Abstrakt: |
This paper deals with motives and consequences of regulatory involvement in cooperative card payment networks across the European Union and USA. The aim is to draw a bridge between the theoretical framework of two-sided markets and observable industry characteristics. By consolidating a data set on intra- and inter-industry concentration in acquiring, issuing and card scheme markets, a multivariate analysis of the determinants of interchange fees is enabled. Unlike previous studies, it departs from a pure theoretical view and empirically assesses the influence of concentration, rather than market externalities, in the setting of interchange fees. Findings allow for a preliminary assessment of the applicability of established theoretical models and policy intervention in card payment markets. Contrary to widespread belief, acquirer markets show to be highly (and more) concentrated than issuer markets which are characterised by a relative degree of concentration. Results show that concentration has a statistically significant influence on the setting of interchange fees in credit and debit card markets. Findings within this paper call for a more conservative regulatory involvement, as well as a review of utilised economic models incorporating empirical evidence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
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