| Abstrakt: |
Elected judges have been the subjects of numerous studies that find their behavior and practices change when faced with elections. However, there is very little research that examines the effects of elections on law enforcement officials. Among law enforcement officials, Sheriffs are unique in their status as an official politician. To what extent do elected county sheriffs change their behavior and practices in response to election cycles? The author theorizes that Sheriff Deputies are more likely to be tough on harsh crimes in the year leading up to an election, and less active with regards to non-violent crimes since these crimes are associated with less public support and are potentially committed by citizens that are more likely to be constituents. The author examines the behavior of Sheriff Deputies across Florida in 2005-2016 and using empirical support to prove this theory argues that the institution of electing criminal justice figures, such as Sheriffs, can be considered as a U.S. local government failure. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
