Expressivism and Crossed Disagreements.

Autor: Osorio, Javier, Villanueva, Neftali
Zdroj: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement; Oct2019, Vol. 86, p111-132, 22p
Abstrakt: The purpose of this paper is to explore the connection between expressivism and disagreement. More in particular, the aim is to defend that one of the desiderata that can be derived from the study of disagreement, the explanation of 'crossed disagreements', can only be accommodated within a semantic theory that respects, at the meta-semantic level, certain expressivistic restrictions. We will compare contemporary dynamic expressivism with three different varieties of contextualist strategies to accommodate the specificities of evaluative language –indexical contextualism – truth-conditional pragmatics –, pragmatic strategies using implicatures, and presuppositional accounts. Our conclusion will be that certain assumptions of expressivism are necessary in order to provide a semantic account of evaluative uses of language that can allow us to detect and prevent crossed disagreements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]
Databáze: Complementary Index