| Autor: |
Černý, Jakub, Boýanský, Branislav, Kiekintveld, Christopher |
| Předmět: |
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| Zdroj: |
EC: Economics & Computation; 6/18/2018, p151-168, 18p |
| Abstrakt: |
Dynamic interaction appears in many real-world scenarios where players are able to observe (perhaps imperfectly) the actions of another player and react accordingly. We consider the baseline representation of dynamic games - the extensive form - and focus on computing Stackelberg equilibrium (SE), where the leader commits to a strategy to which the follower plays a best response. For one-shot games (e.g., security games), strategy-generation (SG) algorithms offer dramatic speed-up by incrementally expanding the strategy spaces. However, a direct application of SG to extensive-form games (EFGs) does not bring a similar speed-up since it typically results in a nearly-complete strategy space. Our contributions are twofold: (1) for the first time we introduce an algorithm that allows us to incrementally expand the strategy space to find a SE in EFGs; (2) we introduce a heuristic variant of the algorithm that is theoretically incomplete, but in practice allows us to find exact (or close-to optimal) Stackelberg equilibrium by constructing a significantly smaller strategy space. Our experimental evaluation confirms that we are able to compute SE by considering only a fraction of the strategy space that often leads to a significant speed-up in computation times. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Databáze: |
Complementary Index |
| Externí odkaz: |
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