| Abstrakt: |
Election security is a challenge. We cannot stop hackers with 100% assurance, so paper ballots are the first defense. They are not enough, because hand-counting 100 million ballots would be a nightmare if a widespread hack changes winners all over the country. The second defense is to scan those paper ballots, as some election jurisdictions already do. Scanning fixes several problems. Digital signatures, or hash values, will ensure reliable scans and copies. Storing these copies separately will foil breakins, fire, flood, and insider risks. The copies can be independently counted, and attackers cannot subvert them all. Scans remove barriers which make election audits hard. Scans address risks in election machines. These do not go online, but they can be hacked when they are at the manufacturer, when they get annual updates, when they wait unguarded in precincts, and when results are copied out electronically for posting on the web. We need to work with these machines, since they cost millions to replace. I look at audits and hand-counts in California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, Nevada and Washington. Scans and independent counts will reveal when official counts are wrong, and will let us recover. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
